Evidentiality and illocutionary force: Spanish matrix *que at the syntax-pragmatics interface*

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Abstract: This paper centers on certain aspects of the syntax-semantics-pragmatics interface. Its main contribution is that it incorporates into the wide crosslinguistic list of grammatical evidentials one type of Spanish *que* ‘that’, which is claimed to have evolved into this category from a complementizer. To set our argument two cases are described: (i) (discourse initial) root clauses headed by *que* introducing a speech event (Etxepare 2007, 2010) which is reported; (ii) *que*-clauses reproducing previous discourse. Both descriptive and theoretical approaches group these instances of *que* together. We show, instead, that first *que* is a “reportative evidential” while the second one is an “echoic” *que*, a true (“insubordinate”) complementizer, in some cases selected by a silent communication verb. The semantic and syntactic properties of both types of *que* are carefully described and syntactic-semantic analyses in terms of “illocutionary force” and discourse operators are proposed. Implications for the theory of the Left Periphery are also discussed.

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1. Introduction

1.1. The data

In relatively recent work on what could be called the UG problem, namely, how to make it restricted enough to be compatible with the ‘poverty of stimulus’ argument, it has been claimed (Chomsky 2005) that there are language-independent principles interacting with the computational system. In other words, there are interface conditions that the expressions generated by a language must satisfy because they are imposed by the systems with which it interacts (phonetics, semantics, pragmatics, all aspects that are integrated into the Conceptual-Intentional and Articulatory-Perceptual systems). Given such a hypothesis what is expected is, for instance, that some (few) parts of syntactic projections express relevant pragmatic distinctions which are grammaticized.

In this line, Speas (2004) and Speas & Tenny (2003) elaborate the idea that syntactic structures include projections of certain pragmatic features. The cartographic approaches to syntactic configurations (Rizzi 1997, Cinque 1999) follow a similar line of thinking; they claim that a universal order of functional projections above IP (Topic, Focus, modal and speaker oriented adverbs, etc.), reflect the status of the information contained in the proposition such as new, given, asserted, presupposed, among other possibilities. More recently Sheehan & Hinzen (2011) argue that relevant modes of reference (objects, facts, propositions) are inherently grammatical and reflect deictic distinctions which correlate with derivational ‘phases’. All studies under a ‘structured semantics’ approach (Jackendoff 1990, 2002, Sigurðsson 2004, Giorgi 2010 and Zubizarreta in this volume) would fit into this line of research. Finally, all the studies on the relation between sentence types and illocutionary force (among the more recent ones Truckenbrodt 2006 and Zaefferer 2006 and the references therein) and on the semantic motivation of “insubordination” (root sentences with syntactic properties of embedded ones), specially in the Germanic languages (Heycock 2006), could help to strength comparative perspectives, even if in a preliminary way.

Within this background, our main concern in this paper is to study some aspects of the syntax–pragmatics (discourse) interface through the analysis of certain Spanish (apparently) independent clauses headed by an overt complementizer. In particular, we study two types of structures tentatively exemplified in (1)–(2), with the aim to
determine the nature of the que (equivalent to English that) introducing them, as well as the ‘left periphery’ projected in each one of them:

(1) a. Oye, que el Barça ha ganado la Champions.
    listen that the Barça has won the Champions-League
    (Etxepare 2007: 25–26)

b. Que el paquete no ha llegado.
    that the parcel not has arrived

(2) a. Que si me das un kilo de tomates.
    that if to-me you-give one kilo of tomatoes
    ‘(I said that) if I can have one kilo of tomatoes.’

b. Speaker A
   – No me he acordado de sacar las entradas.
     not REFL I-have remembered of get the tickets
     ‘I did not remember to get the tickets.’

Speaker B
   – ¿Que no te has acordado?
     that not REFL you-have remembered
     ‘(Are you saying/do you mean) that you did not remember?’

(Porroche Ballesteros 2000: 104)

In descriptive approaches (Spitzer 1942, Porroche Ballesteros 2000, Rodríguez Ramalle 2008a) these instances of que are usually analyzed altogether as cases of “que narrativo” (‘narrative que’) or “que explicativo” (‘explicative que’) (Spitzer 1942), “que discourse marker/reiterative” (Porroche Ballesteros 2000), etc. From a theoretical perspective the structures in (1) and (2) have also been analyzed together by Etxepare (2007, 2010).

In Demonte & Fernández-Soriano (in press), it is noted that sentences like those in (1) have different properties from those in (2) and seem to constitute a distinct class. In the following pages, we will try to show that, in fact, these two groups of sentences, and consequently the que that heads them, are both semantically/pragmatically and syntactically different.

This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our data and establish their specific properties; differences with other instances of root complementizers such
as certain cases of “insubordination” in Germanic languages are also schematized. In section 3 we define evidentiality (3.1) and try to establish the properties that characterize this grammatical device and determine differences among subtypes of evidentials and among the main semantic categories they encode. In 3.2 we examine the syntactic-semantic behavior of sentences of the type exemplified in (1) with respect to the main tests used as a diagnosis for evidentiality and conclude that *que* has all the features of a genuine evidential marker. We will justify the proposal that this *que* is a ‘reportative’ evidential and also that it is better characterized as an illocutionary operator rather than as an ‘epistemic modal’. In the final subsection (3.3) we will compare our ‘evidential’ *que* with Mexican Spanish *dizque* (Travis 2006) and *quesque* (Treviño 2008) which have also been analyzed as evidentials. In section 4 we will unveil a second apparently root *que* – the one exemplified in (2) – that we name ‘echoic’ and which, according to the typical tests, cannot be considered an evidential. This *que* will be characterized instead as a head of insubordinate clauses that take on special interpretations that distinguish them both from ‘normal’ main and standard subordinate clauses. In both section 3 and 4 we will propose preliminary formal analyses of the two *que*. In section 5 we will briefly state our conclusions.

2. The data. An overview of root complementizers

2.1. Two new cases of root *que* in Spanish

Let us start by describing the contexts of use of cases (1) and (2) above. As Etxepare (2007, 2010) states it, (1a), as opposed to the corresponding version without *que*, “would be appropriate if I were listening to the radio and heard that Barça won the Champions League” (2010: 65). “In this case I would be implying that I got the news from someone else’s saying” (2007: 26). In Etxepare’s terms, these sentences involve a speech event witnessed by the speaker. This speech eventuality is mapped in the grammatical representation as a quotative predicate. We will come back to Etxepare’s syntactic-semantic representation in the next section.

Regarding the contexts for (2), the first sentence would be appropriate if the speaker had previously asked a question such as *¿Me das un kilo de tomates?* ‘Can I have a kilo of tomatoes?’, and in the case the addressee does not answer, she repeats the question.
On the other hand, in (2b) speaker B repeats the assertion made by speaker A in the form of a rhetorical question that makes reference to the illocutionary act and expresses surprise, anger, scorn, etc. The common property of these cases is that they are ‘echoic’; the speaker does not report a particular state of affairs but reproduces or refers to another utterance or thought to show her reaction (Wilson 2006).

In terms of the structure involved in each type of sentence, we would like to note first that the ones in (1), although introduced by an instance of *que* which is usually a (subordinating) complementizer, are genuine *root* clauses: they can be discourse initial (pronounced out-of-the-blue), and cannot embed under any predicate. In contrast, the sentences in (2) (which are not new utterances but imply a previous discourse) will be shown to constitute embedded structures introduced by a complementizer. It will be shown that a silent “assertive verb” (*say, claim, assert, vow, report, think, believe*; Hooper & Thompson 1973, Sheehan & Hinzen 2011: 32) can be postulated in most cases.

In this paper we would like to formalize these observations in terms of the linguistic categories of “evidentiality” and “insubordination”. In fact, careful analysis shows that, contrary to what might appear, (1) and (2) are not headed by the same *que*. In particular, our claim will be that *que* in (2) is a complementizer (with an additional discourse interpretation) whereas in (1) it is the result of the evolution of a complementizer into a reportative evidential.¹ We would thus have (at least) two homophonous *que*.

Before moving any further, for the sake of clarity and correct understanding of the data, it is important to note that, given the homophony of *que*, and the silent nature of the verbal form proposed for (2), among other factors, the sentences analyzed here frequently give rise to ambiguity, which sometimes can only be solved by intonation. In particular, sentences like (1a) have a threefold reading: the ‘reportative’ reading we have just briefly illustrated and that will be dealt with in section 3; the reading with an omitted verb in which somebody repeats or glosses a previous statement and at the same time provides the speaker’s reaction to a previous utterance in a stretch of discourse (the

¹ Treviño (2008) analyzes both case (1) and (2) as well as other instances of complex particles including *que* as evidentials (see below). On the other hand, Rodríguez Ramalle (2008b) labels the *que* appearing in certain sentences, both root and embedded, some of them similar to the ones above, “evidential *que*”. However, in this second case there is no analysis which locates *que* within the grammatical-semantic category of evidentials.
echoic reading); and even a third one (correctly noted by one of our referees) in which the sentence is just a speaker’s (out-of-the-blue) assertion.² We will assume, as seems plausible, that there are different semantic representations for each type and that in the case of the evidential meaning there is also a specific syntactic representation different from the other cases. In what follows we will try to give the appropriate scenario in order to avoid ambiguity. The ungrammaticality/inadequacy marks will of course apply to the intended reading.

2.2. Spanish root que and insubordination

Let us now make some comparative observations in order to situate the phenomenon under study and understand it in the adequate context. Root clauses headed by subordination markers are not uncommon cross-linguistically.³ Actually the phenomenon of so called insubordination⁴ has been attested in many languages, such as Germanic and Scandinavian (Reis 2006, Truckenbrodt 2006), as well as in Romance (Franco 2009, Ledgeway 2005).⁵ A look at the data described shows that the phenomenon has some specific properties.

To start with Germanic languages, root clauses in German can be introduced by the complementizer dass. The crucial fact for us is that root dass is basically restricted to contexts with particular mood values: exclamatives, desideratives and directives (imperatives), as can be seen in (3), taken from Zaefferer (2006) and Truckenbrodt (2006) (we leave the author’s glosses untouched):

(3) a. Dass das noch keiner gemerkt hat! (exclamative)
    COMP DEM still nobody notice PERF (from Zaefferer 2006)

b. Dass du (ja) das Fenster öffnest! (directive)
    that you (PRT) the window open

² The third reading detected, in fact, corresponds to another instance of root que, which does not involve any speech event of previous discourse, but has the meaning of bringing into the hearer’s mind a significant proposition, usually with a directive reading. At the moment, we do not have a formal analysis for these structures.

³ We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the necessity to clarify this point here.

⁴ The term “insubordination” was introduced by Evans (2007) to describe cases where a matrix utterance exhibits morpho-syntactic properties that are otherwise indicative of subordinate clauses.

⁵ It has also been described for languages like Tlingit (Cable 2011).
‘(Don’t forget to) open the window!’ (from Truckenbrodt 2006)

c. Dass ich noch einmal Venedig sehen könnte! (desiderative)

that I still once Venice see could

‘I would like to see Venice once more.’ (from Truckenbrodt 2006)

A common property of these structures is that they alternate with V2. This can be taken to indicate that dass in (3), (4) occupies the same position as the finite verb in the corresponding V-in-C variant. Moreover, as Truckenbrodt (2006) observes, in contrast with structures with the finite verb in C, root dass clauses cannot be used as declaratives, to make assertions (or declarative questions). So “it is only when the indicative morphology is in C, as in a (V-in-C) declarative that it […] leads to readings of the proposition as assertion” (Truckenbrodt 2006: 262). When dass, and not the indicative morphology, is in C “the consequence is dramatic: the root dass-clause has the deontic readings as well as an exclamative reading […], but no epistemic reading whatsoever. For one thing, it cannot be an assertion” (Truckenbrodt 2006: 270). So root dass clauses are very different from the ones we have described in (1) and (2) for Spanish: they are reduced in their illocutionary potential to purely deontic (or purely exclamative) readings. In this, as the mentioned author notes, they are “like other sentence types with no indicative/Konj. II in C: the imperative and the root infinitive”.

The same seems to hold for Romance cases, such as Calabrian dialects analyzed by Ledgeway (2005). This author shows that in the dialect of Siderno the complementizer chi can head sentences of an exhortative/optative nature, which “licenses and spells out the imperatival illocutionary force of the sentences concerned” (fn. 35). An example of a desiderative use is in (4):

(4) Calabrian (dialect of Siderno)

Chimmu mi nesciunu li corna!

that to-me come the horns

‘May I grow a pair of horns!’

Franco (2009: 197) identifies yet another case of matrix complementizer in Romance; the following examples are from both Old and Modern Italian (Franco’s (360)):
(5) Modern Italian

a. *Non piangere, che ti cola il trucco.*
   not cry that 2S-DAT-CL drips the make up
   ‘Don’t cry, or your make up would drip.’

b. *Dai, che ce la fai!*
   give.2S that 3S-ACC-CL make.2S
   ‘Come on, you can make it!’

As Franco (2009: 197) notes, this type of *che* “needs a previous context specifying the circumstances in which the clause it introduces can be uttered”. Clauses of this type can be understood as adverbial peripheral clauses in the sense of Haegeman (2010). The value of the complementizer in (8) is that of a causal/final particle.

All these cases are different from the Spanish ones we present in (1) and (2), which do not display any of the particularities just described. To be more precise, as expected, Spanish does allow for structures analogue to the ones in (3)–(5): independent imperative (6a), exclamative (6b), and desiderative (6c):

(6) a. *¡Que te marches!*
   that you leave
   ‘Leave!’

b. *¡Qué frío que hace!*
   how cold that makes
   ‘How cold it is!’

c. *(Ojalá) que llueva café.*
   PRT that rain.3S-SUBJ coffee
   ‘May it rain coffee!’ (Song, Juan Luis Guerra)

In Demonte & Fernández-Soriano (2009) these cases are analyzed within a left periphery approach, and the *que* is claimed to be in Finiteness Phrase (FinP). Sentences such as (7) where *que* is a causal (7a) or purpose (7b) conjunction are also possible.

(7) a. *No vengas, que te vas a aburrir.*
Do not come.2S-SUBJ that you go to bore
‘Do not come because you will get bored.’ (Spontaneous, Madrid)

b. Acércate, que te vea mejor.
come-closer that to-you see.1S-SUBJ better
‘Come closer, so that I can see you better.’ (Spontaneous, Madrid)

In contrast with all these cases, the structures in (1) and (2) (which do not introduce special – directive or desiderative – moods or are adverbal in nature) are quite singular, and constitute two very different cases of root complementizers, as we have anticipated. In the next sections we will further describe both of them and try to provide an analysis for each one.

3. Reportative que. An indirect evidential

3.1. Evidentiality

A number of languages have a set of affixes or particles that express the means by which the speaker acquired the information s/he was conveying: evidentials.6 Speas (2004), in discussing how pragmatic features are grammatically represented, notes that “some languages have evidential morphemes which mark the Speaker’s source for the information being reported in the utterance” (2004: 255). Evidentials do not constitute a homogenous category (Chafe & Nichols (eds) 1986) and sometimes they do not even constitute homogeneous morphological classes (Jacobsen 1986). Nevertheless, the inventory of grammatical evidentials is restricted. Something which is very clear is that the primary meaning of a grammatical evidential is only ‘information source’. As Speas (2004: 257) notes, “only a short set of categories out of a potentially infinite set of sources of evidence (parental advice, legal edict, divine revelation, etc.) are grammaticized in evidential paradigms”. It can also be said that they are generally morphological (verbal) markers or particles, some derived from verbs like see, hear and say (Gordon 1986, Aikhenvald 2006). In most cases evidentials are obligatory although this is not general either (Aikhenvald 2004).

6 The term ‘evidential’ was first introduced by Jakobson (1957). Aikhenvald’s (2004) study is an extensive summary of work on this category.
Putting it in more formal terms, evidentiality is a linguistic category encoding speaker-oriented qualifications of propositions in terms of the evidence they are based on. Languages differ in how detailed a distinction of evidential categories they make (see Aikhenvald 2006), as we will illustrate. The (most basic) distinction which will be relevant for our purposes is that between direct (first-hand) and indirect (reported or inferential) evidence.

Izvorski (1997) claims that evidentials are also marked with respect to the speaker’s commitment to their truth ((dis)belief/agnosticism). Aikhenvald (2004: 3) extensively shows that evidentials do not have to relate to the “degree of speaker’s certainty concerning the statement or whether it is true or not”, although this is very often a possible meaning extension. We will come back to this issue later.

Moreover, evidentials do not affect the truth value of a sentence, and sometimes an evidential can have a truth value of its own, and can even acquire its own time reference.\footnote{See Chafe & Nichols (eds) (1986) for a description of evidentials in different language types.}

It is important to bear in mind that evidentiality is to be understood as a grammatical device. In other words, probably all languages have a way of expressing the status of the speaker’s presentation of the source of information. Languages like English, for example, express evidential distinctions lexically (through adverbs like allegedly, reportedly, etc., verbal constructions such as it is said, I heard, etc.). These are called “evidentiality strategies” (Aikhenvald 2004), which historically sometimes give rise to grammatical evidentials. Only some languages grammaticize evidentiality and encode it in their (inflectional) morphology or in their particle system (complementizers, for instance) (cf. Palmer 1986, Willett 1988).

Languages employing evidential morphemes further differ depending on how many evidential morphemes they have and what type of evidence each morpheme indicates. Below we give some examples of evidentials in different languages.\footnote{Note that different languages may ‘divide’ the type of evidence in different ways. For example, both Abkhaz and Lezgian have two evidentials, but Abkhaz distinguishes non-firsthand evidence from everything else, whereas Lezgian distinguishes reportative evidence from everything else. For a detailed discussion, see Aikhenvald (2004: chap. 2).} \footnote{We deeply thank Dongsik Lim for finding and organizing these examples for us.}
Firsthand vs. non-firsthand evidence

(i) *wesa* *u-tlis-ʌʔi*

**cat** it-run-FIRSTH.PAST

‘A cat ran.’ (I saw it running.)

(ii) *u-wonis-eʔi*

**he-speak-NON.FIRSTH.PAST**

‘He spoke.’ (Someone told me.)

b. St’át’imcets (Matthewson, Davis & Rullmann 2007: 202–203)
Reportative, inferential vs. (inference from) perceived evidence

(i) *waʔku7 ku stś’ets’quaz’ l-ta stswáw’cw-a*

be REPORT DET trout in-DET creek-EXIST

‘[Reportedly] there are trout in the creek.’

(ii) *plan k’a tuʔ waʔ tuʔc na máqʔ-a*

already INFER then IMPF melt(INCH) DET snow-EXIST

‘The snow must have melted already.’

(iii) *Pel’p-s-ácw-an’ nelh nelklíh-sw-a*

lost-CAUS-2SG.CONJ-PERC.EVID DEP.PL key-2SG.POSS-EXIST

‘It looks like you’ve lost your keys.’

c. Tucano (Aikhenvald 2004: 52)
Visual, non-visual sensory, inferred, reported

(i) *diây ya’i-re yaha-ámi*

**dog** fish-TOP.NON.A/S steal-REC.P.VIS.3sgnf

‘The dog stole the fish.’ (I saw it.)

(ii) *diây ya’i-re yaha-áṣí*

**dog** fish-TOP.NON.A/S steal-REC.P.NONVIS.3sgnf

‘The dog stole the fish.’ (I heard the noise.)

(iii) *iây ya’i-re yaha-áfí*

**dog** fish-TOP.NON.A/S steal-REC.P.INFER.3sgnf

‘The dog stole the fish.’ (I inferred it.)

(iv) *diây ya’i-re yaha-ápi’*

**dog** fish-TOP.NON.A/S steal-REC.P.REP.3sgnf

‘The dog stole the fish.’ (I have learnt it from someone else.)
d. Wintu (Aikhenvald 2004: 60)

Visual, non-visual sensory, inferred, assumed and reported

(i)  \textit{K'upa-be}'

‘He is chopping wood.’ (VISUAL)

(Scenario: I see or have seen him.)

(ii) \textit{K'upa-nth}\textsuperscript{e}'

‘He is chopping wood.’ (NON-VISUAL SENSORY)

(Scenario: I hear him or a chip flies off and hits me.)

(iii) \textit{K'upa-re}'

‘He is chopping wood.’ (INFERRED)

(Scenario: I go to his cabin and find him absent and his axe gone.)

(iv) \textit{K'upa-ʔel}\textsuperscript{e}'

‘He is chopping wood.’ (ASSUMED (EXPERIENTIAL))

(Scenario: I know that he has a job chopping wood every day at this hour, that he is a dependable employee, and perhaps that he is not in his cabin.)

(v) \textit{K'upa-ke}'

‘He is chopping wood.’ (REPORTED)

(Scenario: I know from hearsay.)

As described in Faller (2002), Quechua has three types of evidentials (which are always enclitic): direct, reportative and conjectural.

(9) Quechua (Weber 1986, \textit{apud} Speas 2004: 256)

a. \textit{wañu-nqa-paq-mi}

‘It will die.’ (I assert.)

b. \textit{wañu-nqa-paq-shi}

‘It will die.’ (I was told.)

c. \textit{wañu-nqa-paq-chi}

‘It will die.’ (perhaps)
We will be mostly concerned with what have been called ‘indirect’ evidentials. Izvorski (1997) examines the meaning of indirect evidentials such as the perfect of evidentiality in languages like Bulgarian, Turkish and Norwegian and compares it to English adverbs like *apparently*. Essentially, this author analyzes evidentials as “epistemic modals with a universal modal force and a more restricted domain of quantification than that of ‘ordinary’ epistemic operators” (p. 224). Other authors (Chung 2007, Matthewson, Davis & Rullmann 2007, Rullmann, Matthewson & Davis 2008) also view evidentials as epistemic modals. Contrary to this view, Aikhenvald shows that although evidentials can have secondary meanings of reliability, probability/possibility (epistemic extensions), this does not always have to be the case. She further states that “evidentiality is a category of its own right, and not a subcategory of any modality” (2004: 7).

In an alternative view, evidentials are not considered as epistemic modals but have been analyzed as encoding illocutionary modifiers (e.g., Faller 2002, 2006) which affect the illocutionary force (in the sense of Searle 1969 and Searle & Vanderveken 1985), including the illocutionary points and sincerity conditions. According to Faller (2002: 231) evidentials “add to or modify the sincerity conditions of the act they apply to”, they are functions from speech acts to speech acts.

As Lim (2010) notes, there is also an intermediate position, according to which evidentiality can be encoded as epistemic modals in some morphemes and as illocutionary operators in others (e.g., Garrett 2001).10

With respect to the general ways in which languages encode evidentiality, Lim (2010) makes a distinction between *broad* and *narrow* evidentials. As we said, all languages have evidential sentences, so if we assert “John said that Mary ate the pie” the speaker is making explicit the source of information through a lexical resource: the verb of the matrix clause. In the same way, in a sentence like *I saw that it was raining*, the matrix verb expresses perceptual evidence. Epistemic modals and speaker-oriented adverbs would take a similar role. These are *broad* evidentials, which basically correspond to what Aikhenvald calls ‘evidentiality strategies’. We have *narrow*

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10 Lim (2010: 15) also mentions a new approach in which “some niches with the landscape of evidentiality have been characterized in terms of a special-kind [sic] of tense semantics” (e.g., Faller 2002, Chung 2007). We will not develop this question any further.
evidentiality when a language develops specific linguistic categories to express evidential meaning, as in the examples in (8) and (9).

Among the various characteristics of narrow evidentials an important one is that “the meaning introduced by the narrow evidential marker is not truth conditional and the evidential marker does not contribute to the truth-conditional meaning” (Lim 2010: 8). Another relevant general observation is that evidentiality is always speaker-oriented or speaker-anchored and thus there is no natural language which has the evidential marker indicating the addressee’s reportative evidence or the third person’s perceptive evidence.

With this framework in mind, in what follows we will analyze Spanish constructions introduced in (1)–(2). We will start by describing and analyzing the cases in (1).

3.2. A description of reportative que

The complementizer que which appears in some Spanish root sentences has been analyzed by Etxepare (2007, 2010), where a description and formal account is provided of what the author calls “quotative que”. Among other types of examples (to which we will return), Etxepare centers his study in cases like the ones in (1), repeated in (10); in (11) we provide other examples:

(10) a. Que el Barça ha ganado la Champions.
that the Barça has won the Champions
b. (Oye), que el paquete no ha llegado.
listen that the parcel not has arrived

(11) a. Bueno, pues estaba una mañana en Interview y me llamó mi hermano y me dice: Oye, que ha sido depuesta Benazir. well, so was one morning in Interview and to-me called my brother and to.me tells: listen that has been deposed Benazir ‘Well, one morning I was in Interview and my brother calls and says: hey, Benazir has been deposed.’ (CREA, oral, Spain)
b. En la cena nos llama un compañero, oye que está nevando en el campo de vuelo.
at the dinner us calls a companion, listen that is snowing at the field of flying
At dinner a colleague calls and says, hey it is snowing at the flying field.’

As we said in the first section, the presence of *que* in these structures contributes the additional meaning that the sentence constitutes the *report* of a speech event. Etxepare, adopting a Davidsonian analysis of indirect discourse, claims that *que* in (10) and (11) is generated in sentences with an underlying predication relation between a clausal constituent (Force Phrase) and a quotative predicate (an utterance). We refer the reader to the cited works for further details.

We will be concerned with the behavior of this *que* in what follows. One property that characterizes the sentences in (10) and (11) is that they can be discourse initial, and

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11 Example provided by one of the referees. We exclude the meaning in which the sentence is used to produce a reaction in the hearer, not just to report an information (see fn. 3).

12 Etxepare’s (2007, 2010) studies extend to other types of constructions, in particular to cases such as (i), where the presence of *que* implies that the hearer is requested to actually say something (“the tobacco is mine”), to cases such as (ii), where both the agent and the goal of the speech event are explicit, and to those as (iii) where a sentence introduced by *que* is an answer to a previous question:

(i)  *Si viene mi madre, que el tabaco es tuyo.*
    ‘If my mother comes, say that the tobacco is yours.’

(ii) a. *Tu padre a Juan {que cuándo viene/ que se vaya.}*
    your father to Juan that when comes that he-leaves
    ‘Your father is saying to Juan: When does he come/?Let him leave.’

   b. *María a Pedro que Juan no viene.*
    ‘María is saying to Pedro that Juan is not coming.’

(iii) *¿Qué ha dicho?*
    ‘What did he say?’
    – *Que no quiere venir.*
    that not wants to-come
    ‘That he doesn’t want to come.’

These cases can be shown to constitute a different class, which will be accounted for in the following section. One important difference with respect to the sentences in (10) and (11) is that (i), (ii) and (iii) cannot be discourse initial. Our claim will be that an implicit verb of communication is present in these sentences.
thus pronounced in out-of-the-blue contexts. One can, for example, enter a room and say (10a) or (10b). The same is true for (12a,b).

(12) a. (Oye), que mañana no hay clase.
   listen that tomorrow not there-is class
   ‘Listen, there will be no class tomorrow (someone said/ I just heard).’

b. Que ha dimitido el decano.
   that has resigned the dean
   ‘The dean has resigned (someone said/ I just heard).’

(spontaneous, Madrid)

In relation with this property, it has also to be noted that sentences like the ones in (10)–
(12) behave as root sentences according to some of the typical structural root
phenomena. For instance, they can be preceded by hanging topics (13a), and they
cannot appear as sentence fragments in question-answer pairs (13b):

(13) a. El campo de vuelo, que está nevando allí.
   the flying field that it is snowing there
   “About the flying field, it is snowing over there”

b. – ¿Por qué lloras?
   ‘Why are you crying?’
   – #Que el Barça ha ganado la Champions.
   that the Barça has won the Champions

A third observation that needs to be made is that sentences in (10) to (11), as we said,
refer to a (speech) event, and not to a particular utterance. That is, in order to say (10),
for example, the speaker may have heard something like (14) and report the relevant
information:

(14) Final del partido: Barcelona dos Real Madrid uno.
   end of-the match Barcelona two Real Madrid one
This seems to suggest, contrary to Etxepare’s view, that this *que* is better described as “reportative” rather than “quotative”. It is also important to notice that in order for (10a) to be adequate, (14) must have been actually uttered by someone. For example, if the speaker has seen the end of the match she cannot utter (1) = (10a) with reportative *que*, only the version without *que*.

Going one step further, our claim is that the *que* which appears in (10)–(12) is a(n indirect) reportative evidential.\(^{13}\) According to Izvorski (1997), the indirect evidential interpretation allows both a report and an inference reading (evidence from what the speaker heard or inferred from what the speaker heard, etc). This is what we have in the cases in (10)–(12): they can report a speech event or an inference from (linguistic) evidence. As we will show later, evidential *que* does not carry any added modal (doubt or uncertainty) interpretation, as do the evidential markers analyzed by Izvorski (1997).

In what follows we will develop this idea and try to show that the behavior of this *que* suggests that it is similar to reportative (indirect) evidentials.

3.3. Evidence for *que* as an indirect reportative evidential

Reportative evidentials are grammatical elements conveying the information that the source of the proposition is indirect, be it because the speaker has heard it or because she has inferred it from a speech event (see above).

The properties shared by the *que* that appears in (10)–(12) and reportative evidentials are the following:

(a) Reportative evidentials never report a speaker’s or a hearer’s saying. As we mentioned above, *que* in sentences like (1), (10), (11) and (12) also shows this property.\(^{14}\) So (1a) = (10a) can only express a report of something that has been said or

\(^{13}\) Etxepare (2007, 2010) explicitly argues against the evidential nature or his “quotative” *que*, which, as we said, he extends to more cases.

\(^{14}\) Etxepare (2007) claims that this is not the case for Spanish “quotative” *que*, but the examples he provides are not like those in (1), (10)–(12) but like (i), i.e., an answer to a question where the speaker repeats what he just said:

(i) Speaker A: *Juan, tu madre hoy viene a las cinco.*
   Juan your mother today comes at five
   Speaker B: ¿Cómo?
   What?

...
shown by someone different from the speaker and the hearer. This is, in fact, a very clear restriction: the president of a nation, for example, cannot report his own war declaration (which may well be a speech event) headed by this *que*. See (15):

(15)  
#Ciudadanos, {que se ha} / {que hemos} declaradola guerra.

citizens that it-has-been that we-have declared the war

(b) Another property of reportative evidentials is that they are restricted to declarative sentences. Other illocutionary forces are excluded. Again, the same holds for “quotative”/reportative *que*, hence the oddity of exclamatives or questions, as in (16):\(^{15}\)

(16)  
a. #Oye, que ¡qué bonito día hace!
   listen that what nice day it-is
b. #Oye, ¿que hemos ganado la liga?
   listen that we-have won the league?

(c) In Etxepare (2010) it is actually noted that Spanish ‘quotative’ *que* shares another property with reportative evidential morphemes such as those found in Quechuan. As Faller (2002) shows, when a reportative evidential is present, conjunction allows the sum of two illocutionary acts. In this sense, the meaning of the sentence is that two reports take place. On the contrary, disjunction only allows a single-report interpretation. Faller relates this fact to Krifka’s (2001) observation that the logical operation ‘disjunction’ does not apply to speech acts. Examples provided are those in (17) (from Faller 2002: 245–246, *apud* Etxepare 2010):

(17)  
Ines-si utaq Juan-si llalli-sqa.

Ines-REP or Juan-REP win-PAST

Speaker A: *Que tu madre hoy viene a las cinco.*

That your mother today comes at five (From Etxepare 2010: 610)

We claim that these are clearly different cases.

\(^{15}\) Of course, these sentences are acceptable in other contexts and with other interpretations that will be discussed in section 4.
‘Ines or Juan won.’

Evid.: (i) speaker was told that Ines or Juan won
(ii) #speaker was told that Ines won or speaker was told that Juan won

The same is true for reportative que. When it is present, a conjunction of two different illocutionary acts (two reports) is allowed (18a), but this is not the case for disjunction (18b).16

(18) a. Oye, que la película es estupenda y que aún no la
listen that the film is fabulous and that yet not it
han estrenado.
they-have presented
‘Listen, (it has been reported that) the film is fabulous and (it has been reported that) it has not been presented yet.’

b. Oye, que la película es estupenda o que aún no la han estrenado.17
#‘Listen (it has been reported that) the film is fabulous or (it has been reported that) it has not been presented yet.’

As Etxepare (2010: 608) states it, “unlike conjunction, disjunction is only interpreted at the propositional level”. Actually, Krifka noted that speech acts can be conjoined but not disjoined. The reason would be that “the conjunction of acts is obviously equivalent to the consecutive performance” (Krifka 2001: 13). However, disjunction is more complex: different from conjunction “disjunction is interpreted as disjunction of the asserted propositions, not of the acts of assertion” (Krifka 2001: 16). In our case this would imply that when que (or a reportative evidential) is present, conjunction can affect two propositions or two acts of assertion, while disjunction can only access propositions. So when disjunction appears the speaker would not be reporting a speech

17 In this respect, they differ from other cases analyzed by Etxepare (2007), such as the ones in fn. 12. Sentences like (i) can be disjoined, which indicate that they belong to a different type:

(i) Si viene mi madre, que el tabaco es tuyo o que lo hemos encontrado en la calle.
‘If my mother comes (say that) the tobacco is yours or that we just found it in the street.’
event (which is the case if *que* is an evidential). In other words, the interpretation in which the speaker is reporting two alternating speech events is logically impossible.

(d) In relation to the previous property, it has been noted (Faller 2002) that reportative evidentials do not allow for the speech eventuality they imply to be accessed by linguistic operations bearing on propositional truth, such as negation/dissension. For authors who analyze evidentials as modal operators (Izvorski 1997), this fact is due to their presuppositional nature: since they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the sentences they are outside the scope of such operators. Negation/dissension can only access the proposition introduced by the evidential, not the “source of the information” it refers to. Many examples have been provided of this property from different types of evidentials and within different frameworks (see for example Murray 2010).

What is important to us is that, once again, “quotative” *que* behaves on a par with (indirect) evidentials in this respect: the source of information introduced by *que* cannot be affected by negation/dissension. This is why the second part of the following dialogue cannot mean that the speaker did not actually hear that Madrid has won the Champions league but only that the proposition itself (that Madrid has won) is false, as the impossibility of (19b) indicates:

(19) – *Oye que el Madrid ha ganado la Champions.*
listen that the Madrid has won the Champions
a. –*No, qué va, ni hablar, no pueden haber ganado.*
‘No, no way they cannot have won.’
b. – *#No, hombre, no has escuchado eso en ninguna parte.*
‘No, man, you have not heard that anywhere.’

(e) It has been noted that indirect/reportative evidentials are common in folklore tales (see Lim 2010). As Aikhenvald (2006: 324) notes: “the genre of the text may determine the choice of an evidential. Traditional stories are typically cast in reported evidentials”. In this sense, it is interesting that, in the (orally transmitted) literature, one can trace some examples of reportative *que* like the following:

(20) *Que de noche lo mataron*
that of night him they-killed
al caballero.
to-the knight

La gala de Medina,
the jewel of Medina

la flor de Olmedo
the flower of Olmedo

‘For at night they killed / That noble soul / The jewel of Medina / The flower of Olmedo’ (Lope de Vega, El Caballero de Olmedo)

This can be an instance by which we can distinguish a “quotative” evidential from a “reportative” evidential: the latter only indicates that there is someone who says something, whereas the former needs some specific source, which may be salient in the discourse. This is why a reportative evidential can be used in a folklore tale, whose author is generally unclear.

(f) There is still another property that reportative que shares with evidentials: the so-called “first person effect”. Aikhenvald notes that evidentials may develop “additional semantic overtones in the context of first person participants” (2004: 220). In particular, reportative evidentials carry additional meanings if the proposition they head has a first person subject. These are basically new information, ‘unprepared mind’ and surprise. In other words, when the subject of the prejacent is first person, the sentence carries an additional implication that the speaker is not aware of her act, or does not believe what she is asserting (Lim 2010: 60–63). This kind of effect is also found in the Spanish que under analysis, as shown by the following examples:

(21)  a. Scenario: Someone is listening to the lottery results, suddenly he hears his number:
      (Oye,) que he ganado la lotería. [Surprise]
      listen that I-have won the lottery

b. Scenario: Mary receives a letter where it says that she has been nominated Dean:
      (Oye,) que soy la nueva decana. [Unawareness]
      listen that I-am the new dean

c. Scenario: There is a party, the bell rings, a neighbor complains about
the noise, Mary reports:

(Oye,) *que somos muy ruidosos y tenemos que irnos.*

Listen that we-are very noisy and we-have to leave

[Surprise, disagreement]

As opposed to the variant without *que*, (21a) is felicitous if I just heard or I have just been told that I have won the lottery and I am very surprised. The same holds for (21b), which can be uttered if I just read the news or heard the results of the elections. Surprise can also be related to irony or disagreement, as is the case in (21c), which might imply that the speaker thinks that they are wrongly accused or is not convinced of the accuracy of the statement.

In view of all these properties, our proposal is that the *que* under discussion is an indirect reportative (narrow) evidential. The propositions introduced by reportative *que* are interpreted as assertions whose source is a speech event whose agent is other than the speaker or the hearer. According to Willett (1988), it is quite common for languages to have grammaticized only a two-way distinction between direct and indirect evidence, and typically, it is the indirect evidential that is morphologically marked. This, in our approach, would be the case of Spanish.

The analysis just presented amounts to saying that the complementizer in Spanish has evolved into a grammatical marker whose function is that of a reportative evidential. Thus, in contemporary Spanish it would be homonym to the complementizer *que* (as well as to the relative pronoun *que*, among maybe others). This does not necessarily mean that *que* has lost its properties as a complementizer (although it is not introducing a subordinate clause), only that it has acquired those of an evidential marker. This situation reproduces what has happened, for example, with perfect morphemes in Bulgarian, which are evidentials while still preserving their value as aspect markers (see Izvorsky 1997). It would also be similar to German *sollen* which is sometimes used as a deontic verb and sometimes as a reportative (Faller 2006: 5).

As for the precise nature of *que* regarding the two different proposals that have been made for evidentials (epistemic modals vs. illocutionary operators, see section 3.1), it has to be noted that the presence of *que* does not have any implication for the modal interpretation of the sentence. That is, no additional meaning of (degree of) uncertainty is added. The proposal that appears to show up after the preceding analysis is that *que* is
an illocutionary operator introducing evidentiality as a trigger of change in the illocutionary force $F$ of a sentence. Faller (2002) analyzes the meaning of the Quechuan reportative evidential -si in assertions as in (22):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ASSERT}(p) & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{PRESENT}(p) \\
\text{SINC} = \{ \text{Bel}(s, p) \} & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{SINC} = \{ \exists s_2 [\text{Assert}(s_2, p) \land s_2 \notin \{h, s\}] \}
\end{align*}
\]

(Faller 2002: 200, ex. 200)

This formalization, briefly stated, establishes that the speaker changes the ‘illocutionary point’ and converts an act of ‘assertion’ into one of ‘presentation’. This also implies a change in the sincerity conditions: “in assertions, the speaker should believe the truth of what is asserted, but in presentations, there should be another speaker who asserted the prejacent $p$ who is neither the current speaker nor the current addressee” (Lim 2010: 21). In effect, Faller argues that -si has neutral modality, “that is, it does not encode whether or not the speaker believes the embedded proposition to be true or a possibility” (Faller 2002: 23); this contradicts the usual assumption that reportatives typically implicate a low degree of certainty. In the case of Spanish, the neutral meaning is very clear.

We accept that (22) covers Spanish reportative que although it could also be said that in the case of Spanish the speaker presents a sentence uttered by someone else being very much committed to its truth. This additional meaning, which would need to introduce a change in the formalization in (22), is not rare for evidentials either, as Aikhenvald (2004) shows, but this possibility is not discussed further in the paper.

3.4. The nature of evidential que. Dialectal variation and a preliminary analysis

There is another evidential in the domain of Spanish, first studied by Laprade (1976), which, as opposed to our reportative que, does behave as an epistemic modal. In the variety spoken in the Andean area (in contact with Aymara) there is a form: dizque,
which derives from the form *dice que* ‘s/he says that’ (see Hardman 1986).18 Travis (2006) analyzed the behavior of *dizque* in Colombian Spanish (where there is no contact with indigenous languages with evidential systems) and showed precisely that *dizque* has undergone a change by means of which its range of use has extended from functioning as a “purely evidential marker, encoding reported speech and hearsay with a notion of doubt implied in some contexts, to a marker of epistemic modality, encoding extensions of the notion of doubt implied in its evidential use and nothing about source of information” (Travis 2006: 1269). The author claims that this development (from an evidential to an epistemic marker) mirrors that of reported evidentials in languages that have grammaticized systems. We give some examples below:

\[(23)\] \textit{Por ejemplo, el a- – aquí el alcalde, Todo lo que ha hecho, Y... y ahorita, dizque ya lo están investigando.} 
‘For example, the mayor here, all that he’s done, and now, *dizque* he’s under investigation.’ (Travis 2006: ex. 12)

In this case *dizque* simply indicates second hand information. On the contrary, in (24) *dizque* only marks epistemic modality:

\[(24)\] \textit{Fuimos a comprar el refrigerador para la mamá de Wilmar, y me dio por pasar de regreso por el Versalles dizque a comprar pasteles.} 
‘We went to buy the refrigerator for Wilmar’s mother, and on the way back I felt like going by Versalles *dizque* to buy some pastries.’
(Vallejo 1994: 111; \textit{apud} Travis 2006: ex. 26)

Here, as Travis says, “*dizque* does not indicate that the narrator said he wanted to buy pastries but that the consequence of going to the pastry shop was to be something other than what was intended” (2006: 1291).

\[18\] The past tense system has also been shown to express evidential meaning (nonfirsthand information) in Spanish in contact with Quechua spoken in Peru (Klee & Ocampo 1995), and in Spanish in contact with Aymara spoken in Bolivia (Laprade 1981). See also Cornillie (2007) for an analysis of some Spanish (auxiliary) verbs such as *parecer* ‘seem’ in terms of evidentiality. Brucart (2009) shows that the particle *como* has also some properties of an evidential.
Treviño (2008) also analyzes evidential *dizque* and another form, *quesque*, with similar properties, and reports the existence of an evidential *que* found in Mexican Spanish. This *que*, according to Treviño a reportative evidential, differs significantly from evidential *dizque* in that it does not simultaneously transmit what Rooryck (2001a,b) call “status of information”, that is, qualitative evaluation attributed to the sentence (modality). See the examples in (25):

(25)  

a. *Julia escribió un artículo que para publicarlo en Reforma.*  
Julia wrote-3S an article that to publish-it in Reforma  
b. *Lino no viene que porque está enfermo.*  
Lino not come-3S that because is sick

The analysis of this particular *que* exceeds the scope of this paper. We just wanted to strengthen the fact that this reportative *que*, similarly to our case, is not a modal operator.

3.4.1. Que above Force Phrase

Going back to the reportative *que* which is the focus of this section, as for its syntactic properties, we could simply accept Etxepare’s formalization in (26) inasmuch as it states that *que* is generated above the left periphery (i.e. above Force Phrase). Within this approach, sentences like (1a) = (10a) are main sentences and *que* is not a complementizer but a determiner.\(^{19}\) So the main reason to assume this formalization would be that it captures the fact that *que* heads a node above the left periphery of the sentence.

(26) \[
\text{[CP/DP que [RelP [ForceP] [RelP Relator\(^0\) [Quotative Predicate]]]]}
\]
(Etxepare 2010: 619)

However, other, perhaps more accurate, formalizations are possible. In fact, since we have shown that the *que* under examination is an evidential and that it clearly introduces

\(^{19}\) In (26) it is also assumed that a predication relation is established between a propositional object (ForceP) and an element which defines such an object as an “utterance” (the “Quotative” predicate). The predication relation, in turn, is mediated by an abstract element called “relator”.

root structures, we would suggest making crucial use of constrained systems for projecting pragmatically relevant syntactic structure such as the Speech Act Phrase (SAP) proposed by Speas & Tenny (2003). The Speech Act Phrase is a syntactic projection above CP that mediates the syntax–pragmatics interface (27a). SAP has a layered structure like (27b), hosting an evidential projection:

(27) a. \[ \text{SPEECH ACT PHRASE} \] \text{SPEECH ACT} \[ \text{CP} \ldots \]

b.

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{EvalP (SentenceP)} \\
\text{SEAT OF KNOWLEDGE} & \quad \text{Eval’ (Sen’)} \\
\text{Eval (Sen)} & \quad \text{EvidP (sen*)} \\
\text{EVIDENCE} & \quad \text{Evid’ (sen*)} \\
\text{Evid (sen*)} & \quad S \text{(episP)}
\end{align*} \]

In (27b) “reportative mood” would be located in an evidential projection inside Sentience Phrase (Evaluation Phrase in Cinque’s terms), the projection just below SAP, constraining what is called “seat of knowledge” (see Speas & Tenny 2003 for further details). One plausible assumption, we would like to propose, is that our reportative que is the head of an Evidentiality Phrase (EvidP). In the following subsection we will briefly justify this claim.

3.4.2. Evidential que as the head of Evidentiality Phrase

One of the reasons to assume that reportative que is above the left periphery is that it is clearly restricted to matrix clauses: it cannot be embedded under any verb (either in the first or in the third person).\(^{20}\)

(28) *{Digo, repito, informo, he oído} \text{ (oye)} \{\text{que el Barça ha}

I-say I-repeat I-report I-have heard listen that the Barça has

\(^{20}\text{It has been shown that evidentials which are not epistemic modals but speech act modifiers cannot embed (see Kierstead & Martin 2012), so the idea about the speech act modifier nature of reportative que is reinforced.} \)
ganado la champions / que ha dimitido el decano.
won the Champions-League / that has resigned the Dean

It must also be noted that reportative que is restricted to oral speech (in contrast with what will be called “echoic” que in the next section). As we saw, it is usually preceded by particles such as oye ‘listen’ or eh ‘hey’ which are oral devices to attract the hearer’s attention. Instead of reportative que, written discourse (newspapers in particular) usually resorts to specific verbal tenses as a strategy to indicate reported information. It is quite common, at least in Peninsular Spanish press, to use the perfect conditional/potential tense to indicate reported information, as in (29):

(29) a. El acusado habría intentado fugarse.
the defendant would-have tried to-run away
‘Allegedly, the defendant tried to run away.’

b. La catástrofe habría sido causada por una explosión.
the catastrophes would-have been caused by an explosion
‘Reportedly, the catastrophe was caused by an explosion.’

Interestingly enough, this evidential strategy does carry an additional modal (doubt/uncertainty) meaning, and, as expected, is incompatible with reportative que. A sentence such as (30), intended to mean that I heard or read in the news that the robbery has been reported, is completely impossible.

(30) #Oye, que el Banco Central habría sido asaltado
listen that the Bank Central would-have been assaulted
esta mañana por unos adolescentes.
this morning by some teenagers
Intended meaning: The speaker reports what the newspaper gives as reported information.

In the next section we will deal with the other structure identified in the introduction and exemplified in (2).
4. Matrix *que* in echoic structures. Another case of insubordination?

4.1. Description of the data
In this section we will argue that sentences of the type of (1) and (2) above (considered as equivalent by Etxepare 2007, 2010, see also fn. 13, 15) are instances of different structures. Our claim is that that there is another class of root *que* which, as we will show, presents different properties and deserves a different analysis. The main property of the structures we are about to deal with is that the source of the *que*-clause is inside the linguistic context, i.e. there is a particular portion of speech that is (partly) reproduced. We will call this *que* “echoic”. A first set or relevant examples is the following (we only provide literal translations, since the interpretation will be developed in the text):

(31) a. *Que* no quiere venir.
that not wants to-come

b. *Que* qué bonito día hace.
that what nice day it-is

c. *Que* qué quieres.
that what you-want

d. *Que* si me das un kilo de tomates.
that if to-me you-give one kilo of tomatoes

The above examples reproduce sentences that have been previously uttered. These can be declaratives (31a), exclamatives (31b), or questions (31c,d). In contrast with the structures analyzed in the previous section, the source of these sentences does not exclude the speaker or the hearer. Similar cases are those in (32):

(32) a. Moment A:
   – *Viene el autobús.*
     comes the bus

   Moment B:
   – *Que viene el autobús* (¿no me oyes?)
These structures can be described as “echoic”. Echoic structures are used attributively, not merely to report a particular content (an utterance or thought attributed either to the hearer, to third person or to the speaker in the past) but also “to show that the speaker […] wants to inform the hearer of her own reaction to it” (Wilson 2006: 1730). The property of this particular type of non descriptive use is that “the hearer must recognize that the speaker is thinking not directly about the state of affairs but about another utterance or thought” (Wilson 2006: 1729). Echoic structures can convey a wide variety of dissociative attitudes such as surprise, mockery or anger. This is, we claim, what the use of que implies in the cases under study. In (32c), for example, Speaker B echoes Speaker A’s assertion to show that she is thinking about it with the intention to confirm that she has heard/understood correctly, showing surprise and/or anger at the same time. In (32a) the speaker echoes her own assertion because it has not been heard the first time. Hernanz (2007) notes that sequences with sentential assertive adverbs followed by

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21 In this respect, these structures differ crucially with the ones with reportative que, which are descriptively (and not attributively) used. Nevertheless, as Wilson (2006: 1732) notes “the borderline between reporting and echoing is a gradual one”.

22 According to Wilson (2006) irony is also considered an echoic use of language.
que, like *si que* or *bien que*, involve an echoic interpretation. The same effect obtains with adverbs such as *claro* or *naturalmente* when followed by *que*, as in (32b) or (33):

(33) a. *Sí/bien que lo sabe.*
   yes/good that it he-knows
   ‘(Yes,) he does know.’

   b. *Naturalmente/claro que va a hacer sol.*
   naturally sure that it-goes to make sun
   ‘Of course it’s going to be sunny.’

One property of these sentences noted by traditional grammarians is that a silent (assertive) communication verb, such as *say, report, assert, ask* (Sheehan & Hinzen 2011: 32) appears to be understood. In fact, in certain cases, the source of the echoed sentence (i.e. the agent of the silent verb) can be explicit. The following examples are from Porroche Ballesteros (2000). The agent of the communication verb is marked in boldface:

(34) a. *Ese, solo caprichos y ganas de enredar: que si hoy*
   that-one only whims and desire to complicate that if today
   *me compro esto, que si mañana lo vuelvo a vender …*
   REFL I-buy this that if tomorrow it I-return to sell
   ‘That person only wants to fulfill his whims and to be a nuisance: he is always like “today I want (to buy) this”, and “tomorrow I want to give it back”…’

   b. *Y él, que llegábamos tarde, que no se podia*
   and he that we-were late that not one-can
   *salir con nosotros …*
   get-out with us
   ‘And he kept on saying that we were late, that you cannot meet up with us …’

---

23 Rodríguez Ramalle (2008a) notes that these adverbs refer to previous discourse.

Sentences such as (35a), included by Etxepare (2010) in his analysis of reportative que, constitute another instance of this class. In these cases the hearer is requested to explicitly say a particular sentence, so they are to be treated on a par with (31)–(34), introducing an echoic que. In these sentences, in fact, not only the agent (35b) but the goal of the speech event echoed can be explicit, as in (35c):

(35)  
   a. Si viene mi madre, que el tabaco es tuyo.  
       ‘If my mother comes, (say) that the tobacco is yours.’
   b. Si viene mi madre, tú, que el tabaco es tuyo.  
       If comes my mother you that the tobacco is yours  
       ‘If my mother comes you say that the tobacco is yours.’
   c. A mi madre, que el tabaco es tuyo.  
       to my mother that the tobacco is yours  
       ‘Say to my mother that the tobacco is yours.’

Echoic que can also be claimed to appear in sentences containing “resumptive” (pre- or post-clausal) particles. The structure is now interpreted as reassuming a hearer’s statement or set of statements to check a correct interpretation (actually they admit yes or no answers):  

(36) Scenario: After a long conversation in which someone complains about a situation, the speaker concludes:

(Vamos / vaya) que no aguantas más (vamos / vaya).

in-sum that not you -bear anymore in-sum

‘In sum, you cannot bear it anymore, right?’

---

25 One of the referees argues that this que could well not be echoic since it does not reproduce a “previous text”. However, as we noted above, in line with the technical notion of ‘echo’ in pragmatics, echoic structures do not necessarily straightforwardly repeat previous speech; their main property is that the hearer must recognize that the speaker is thinking not directly about the state of affairs but about another utterance or thought present in the linguistic context. This is, we maintain, what we have in (36).
Sometimes what *que* marks is the beginning of a conversation, presenting what the speaker ‘has to say’. For example, in (37) a person signals with his/her hand for someone else to approach, indicating that s/he has something to say (to apologize or to resign, for example). In this context the first sentence of the conversation can be introduced by *que*:

(37) a. *Que lo siento mucho.*
   that it I-regret a-lot
   ‘That I am very sorry.’

b. *Que dimito.*
   that I-resign
   ‘That I resign.’

This *que* can also precede sentences which express the speaker’s conclusion from a particular statement in the form of a question:

(38) –*Antes iba a Villamayor, a la discoteca que había allí.*
   before I-used-to-go to Villamayor to the disco that was there

–*Ah, ¿que también te gusta ir a la discoteca?*
   ah that also you-like to-go to the disco
   ‘Oh, so you also like to go to the disco.’ (Porroche Ballesteros 2000)

The *que* just presented has very clear syntactic and semantic properties that differentiate it from the one analyzed in the previous section. We have hypothesized that in these structures there could be a silent verbal category, a mark that there is a previous speech act. If this were the case, we would be claiming that these sentences, although they appear to ‘stand alone’, are syntactically subordinate sentences embedded under an implicit matrix verb.

However, the sentences in (31)–(38) do not occupy an argument slot of the supposed main verb. As noted by one of our referees all these examples point to a metalinguistic use “where neither the truth of the proposition nor its relativization to an information source [the evidential use] is at stake, but preceding pieces of discourse.” Truckenbrodt (2006) and Cable (2011) have observed that insubordinate clauses (see 2.2 above) take
on special interpretations that distinguish them from ‘normal’ main clauses. Just like insubordinate sentences, the sentences we are considering belong to a specific semantic type which is not simply that of assertions. This additional interpretation, defined above as *echoic*, appears to be in part similar to the background or ‘meta-comment’ semantic sub-type postulated by Cable (2011) for the Tlingit language (and there are also cases which resemble Germanic cases studied in section 2.2). Nevertheless, Spanish echoic structures would constitute a case of insubordination with very well defined properties, which makes them different from the ones previously attested for other languages. In what follows we will analyze the properties of echoic sentences in Spanish with the aim to establish their differences with respect to the sentences with a reportative *que* analyzed in section 3.

4.2. Echoic *que* vs evidential *que*

(a) The first property of echoic *que* that we would like to present is its inability to appear discourse-initially, ‘out-of-the-blue’. All the sentences in (39) are impossible in such out-of-the-blue contexts (this is what the # symbol is meant to indicate); that is why they do not accept the form *oye* ‘hey/listen’, which usually marks the beginning of a discourse (39d):

(39) a. #*Naturalmente que* me voy.
   naturally that I-leave
   b. #*O sea, que* no aguantas más.
   that is that not you-bear any-more
   c. #*Que qué bonito día hace.*
   that what nice day it-is
   d. *Oye, que estás harta, vamos.*
   listen that you-are fed up in-sum

(b) Another crucial property of structures with echoic *que* is that, as we mentioned above, they do not exclude the speaker or the hearer as the source of the statement reported. In fact, these sentences admit speech-oriented adverbs, like *francamente* ‘frankly’ or *honestamente* ‘honestly’, expressing the speaker’s attitude. In this respect, they contrast sharply with the constructions with reportative *que* analyzed in section 3
(compare (15) with (32)). This is why (40a), a case of reportative *que*, is odd when uttered discourse-initially (for example by someone who just enters a room), while this is not the case for (40b) and (40c):

(40) a. *Francamente / honestamente*, que el Madrid ha ganado
   frankly honestly that the Madrid has won
   la liga.
   the league
b. *Francamente / honestamente*, que qué estúpido eres.
   frankly honestly that what stupid you-are
   ‘Frankly/honestly (s/he said/thinks) that you are really stupid’.
c. *Francamente / honestamente*, que nos estás molestando.
   frankly honestly that to-us you-are bothering

(c) The type of *que* we are analyzing in this section also differs from reportative *que* with respect to the scope of negation and the assent/dissent test (Faller 2002). See, in this respect, the contrast between (41a) and (41b):

(41) a. *Que cuándo te vas tú, no que cuándo vuelve Juan.*
   that when REFL-leave you not that when comes Juan
   ‘I am asking when you leave, I am not asking when John comes.’
b. *(Oye) que el Barcelona ha ganado la Champions,*
   listen that the Barcelona has won the Champions
   no que se ha acabado el mundo.
   not that it-has-ended the world
   ‘Listen, I just said that Barcelona has won the Champions not that the world has come to an end.’

This is expected if a silent verb of communication, or other semantic index in the discourse context, which does contribute to the truth conditions of the sentence, is present. In fact there are cases where a statement is repeated literally followed by a sentence (with similar phonetic structure) negating the hearer’s incorrect perception of
what the speaker actually said. The negative sentence is also preceded by *que*. Again this is completely impossible with reportative *que* (see (42b)):

(42)  
  a. *Qué cuándo te vas no que es Santo Tomás.*

  ‘I said: “¿cuándo te vas?”, I didn’t say: “es Santo Tomás”.’

  b. *(Oye), que el pan no ha llegado, no que Juan*

  listen that the bread not has arrived not that Juan

  se ha escapado.

  REFL has escaped

In other words, contrary to what was shown for sentences like (1), (10) and (11), which we claim to involve a narrow evidential, with echoic *que* the association of the core proposition to a previous speech is part of the truth conditional meaning of the sentence. Therefore it is not outside the scope of negation. To see this, take a sentence like (34), repeated as (43). As shown, its contradiction can challenge the evidence the proposition is based on (i.e. the source of information). For this reason, a sentence like (43) admits the two responses given.

(43)  
  a. *Ese, solo caprichos y ganas de enredar: que*

  that-one only whims and desire to complicate that

  *si hoy me compro esto, que si mañana lo vuelvo*

  if today REFL I-buy this that if tomorrow it I-return

  a vender …

  to sell

  ‘That person only wants to fulfill his whims and to be a nuisance: he is always like “today I want (to buy) this”, and “tomorrow I want to give it back” …’

  – *No, ni hablar, nunca dice eso.*

  ‘No, no way, he never says that.’

  b. *Y él, que llegábamos tarde, que no se podía salir*

  and he that we-were late that not one-could get-out

  con nosotros …

  with us
‘And he kept on saying that we were late, that you cannot meet up with us...’
– No es cierto, yo nunca le oí decir esas cosas.
‘It is not true, I never heard him say such things.’

(44) – (O sea/ vamos) que no aguantas más.
‘That is, (you are saying) that you cannot bear it anymore.’
– No, no aguanto más.
‘No, I can’t bear it anymore’.­­
– No, no he dicho eso.
‘No, I did not say that.’

We conclude that que is part of the assertion in these cases.

(d) As one can expect, if this que refers to (chunks of) the linguistic context (and repeats them) it can appear both in coordinations and disjunctions, as can be seen in (45):

(45) a. Ese, sólo caprichos y ganas de enredar:
that-one only whims and desire to complicate
que si me compro esto o que préstame tu nuevo coche ...
that if I-buy this or that lend-me your new car
‘That one, only wants to mess around: he is always like “I am getting this” or “lend me your new car”...’

b. Y él, que llegábamos tarde, que no se podía salir con
and he that we-were late that not one-can get-out with
nosotros o que teníamos que protestar por el retraso ...
us or that we-had to complain for the delay
‘And he kept saying that we were late, that one cannot hang out with us or that we should complain for the delay.’

(e) Actually, the repeated part of the discourse does not have to be a sentence, or even a constituent. Fragments, foreign words, onomatopoeias, etc. can follow echoic que:

(46) Que mañana / que post- / que oui / que ja
that tomorrow that post- that oui that ha

(f) As a last property, if we go through examples (31)–(38) it can be seen that echoic que is not restricted to declarative sentences.

From the properties just revised we can conclude that echoic que is not an evidential marker. And it is not even a broad evidential in the sense of Lim (2010). Our claim is that this que encodes an additional illocutionary value related to general properties of sequences of speech acts. For this reason in certain cases a silent communication verb appears to be involved in the structure.

In effect, Etxepare (2007) notes that aspectual auxiliaries can appear preceding our echoic que, reinforcing the idea of a silent verbal form. For example, variants of (43b) could be similar to (47a). Sequences like (47b), with aspectual auxiliaries such as andar (lit. ‘to walk’) are also possible. Examples in (48) are from Etxepare (2007: 53):

(47)  
   a. Y él estaba que llegábamos tarde, que no
       and he was that we-were late that not
       se podía salir con nosotros o que teníamos que
       one-could get-out with us or that we-had to
       protestar por el retraso...
       complain for the delay
   b. Ese anda todo el día que no le gusta esto, que no
       that-one walks all the day that not he-likes this that not
       quiere venir ...
       wants to-come

(48)  
   a. Tu padre está que cuándo viene.
       your father is that when he-is-coming
       ‘Your father keeps asking when he is coming’
   b. Desgraciadamente, tu padre anda que cuando se irán.26
       unfortunately your father walks that when they-will-leave
       ‘Unfortunately, your father keeps saying: “when are they going to

26 As an anonymous reviewer correctly notes, these structures become more natural if an aspectual (rather
than “temporal”, as the reviewer says) modifier such as todo el tiempo ‘all the time’ is inserted, or if the
que structure is iterated. This is an obvious consequence of the aspectual nature of the auxiliary.
Let us note, as a final relatively side observation, that we can find an interesting similarity between this echoic *que* and the Korean bound morpheme –*ko*.27 The Korean ending –*ko* is generally used as a kind of complementizer, as in the following example:

\[\text{(49) } \text{John-un Mary-ka cip-ey ka-ess-ta-ko} \]
\[\text{John-TOP Mary-NOM home-LOC go-PAST-DECL-COMP} \]
\[\text{sayngkakha-ess-ta.} \]
\[\text{think-PAST-DECL} \]
\[\text{‘John thought Mary went home.’} \]

What is interesting to us is that, in colloquial Korean, -*ko* can be used as a sentential ending, when a speaker repeats what s/he has already said. Examples and relevant scenarios are given below, showing that different types of sentences can be used with this -*ko*.

\[\text{(50) Declarative:} \]
\[\text{After working, Mary came back home. Her brother seemed to be in his room. Mary said:} \]
\[\text{– Na o-ass-e.} \]
\[\text{I come-PAST-DECL} \]
\[\text{(lit.) ‘I came home.’} \]
\[\text{Her brother did not answer. Mary thought that her brother did not hear her, and said again:} \]
\[\text{– Na o-ass-ta-ko.} \]
\[\text{I come-PAST-DECL-COMP} \]
\[\text{(lit.) ‘(I said,) I came home.’} \]

\[\text{(51) Interrogative:} \]
\[\text{Mary would like to know whether her son finished his homework. She asked:} \]

\[\text{27 All the Korean examples below have been provided to us by Dongsik Lim to whom we deeply thank for bringing them to our attention.} \]
Ne swukcey machi-ess-ni?
you homework finish-PAST-Q
‘Did you finish your homework?’
Her son did not answer. She asked again:
Ne swukcey machi-ess-nya-ko?
you homework finish-PAST-Q-COMP
‘(I asked,) did you finish your homework?’

Imperative:
It was time for dinner. Mary said to her son, who was playing outside:
Cenyekmek-e-la.
dinner eat-L-IMP
‘Have dinner.’
Her son kept playing and did not come to have dinner. She told him again:
Cenyekmek-u-la-ko.
dinner eat-L-IMP-COMP
‘(I said,) have dinner.’

This resembles very much what happens with our echoic que, that is, in Korean it seems that the complementizer also serves as a sentential ending which behaves as a quotative marker.

Given the previous set of properties our claim could be that in Spanish root constructions under study que would be the head of Force Phrase (ForceP), in some cases selected by a silent verb, as in (53):

\[
(V) \left[ \text{ForceP} \left[ \text{que} \ldots \ [IP] \right] \right]
\]

As a final remark note that other instances of (more embedded) que are not incompatible with the one analyzed in this section. The following examples are variants of the ones seen above:

\[
\begin{align*}
(54) \quad & \text{a. } O \text{ sea, que esta situación que te está superando, vaya.} \\
& \quad \text{that-is that this situation that to-you is-overwhelming in-sum}
\end{align*}
\]
b. Que qué bonito día que hace.
that what nice day that it-is

c. Si viene mi madre, que el tabaco que es tuyo.
If comes my mother that the tobacco that is yours

In these cases, modified versions of the ones analyzed in this section, we have a que in ForceP followed by a more embedded instance of que. In (54a) and (54b) the second que has been analyzed as heading the Topic Phrase or as being a “reinforcement of force” (see Villa-García 2012 and references therein). In (54b) the que has been proposed to appear in Finiteness Phrase (FinP) (see Demonte & Fernández-Soriano 2009).

Finally, the following table summarizes the properties with respect to which constructions with evidential que and echoic que show different behavior:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>r-QUE</th>
<th>e-QUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can occur discourse-initially</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted to declaratives</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted to narrow scope with negation and disjunction</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restricted to third-person antecedents</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can be fragments, foreign words, onomatopoeias, etc.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can express agent/source of the information</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusion

This paper seeks to contribute to providing a better understanding of certain aspects of the syntax–semantics–pragmatics interface. One core question in this area is what grammatically relevant elements are explicitly elicited by the interaction between these components of the linguistic module. Another one is which theoretical approach or level of analysis is most appropriate to properly characterize such interactions. Since evidential markers are grammatically well defined categories in many languages, and exhibit specific syntactic behavior as well as complex interpretations (related both to
truth conditions and illocutionary force), they are no doubt good candidates to provide useful insights on the mentioned issues.

The first contribution this paper makes is addition of a new item (Spanish que) into the wide list of narrow evidentials that have been attested crosslinguistically.

Evidential que has evolved into this category from that of complementizer, certainly only in well defined contexts. This paper also demonstrates that this element is an indirect reportative evidential. Thus we corroborate the idea that languages that have a much reduced set of evidentials develop indirect reportative ones first. It has also been shown that reportative evidentials do not always encode the interpretation of epistemic modality but instead they can unveil aspects of the speaker’s attitude towards speech acts and about the way in which the relation between speaker, hearer and source of information is established. At the same time, and as a contrasting paradigm to that of narrow evidentiality, we have carefully described the syntactic and semantic properties of another que that we have considered as a candidate to be a root complementizer which contributes an additional interpretation. Different from other Spanish root que (those of insubordinate desiderative or exclamative sentences), this que presupposes a previous speech act and a discourse context. This ‘echoic’ que, as we have termed it, could provide certain hints regarding the internal structure of ForceP/FinitenessP. It also sheds light on a possible subtype of ‘insubordinate’ sentences.

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